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BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under 
Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and §78-2-
2(3)(J) (U.C.A. 1989). This appeal is from a final civil judg-
ment rendered by the Third District Court in Salt Lake County 
sitting in probate which judgment rejected the claim of a 
creditor, appellant Charter Thrift & Loan (Charter), because 
Charter's claim had been filed in 1990 over two years after the 
estate had completed publication of notice to creditors under the 
applicable statute and because Charter had received actual notice 
in 1987 of the probate during the period of notice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. WAS CHARTER ENTITLED TO MORE NOTICE THAN THE APPLICABLE 
STATUTE REQUIRED? 
Applicable Standard of Review; Lower court judgments 
rendered as a matter of law are subject to appellate review 
without giving deference to the lower court's conclusion. Ron 
Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 
(Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National Bank, 737 P.2d 225 
(Utah 1987). 
II. DID DUE PROCESS REQUIRE PERSONAL WRITTEN NOTICE TO 
CHARTER IN ADDITION TO THE 1987 PUBLICATION NOTICE THEN REQUIRED 
BY STATUTE AND THE ACTUAL NOTICE GIVEN IN AUGUST AND SEPTEMBER, 
1987 OF THE PROBATE, THE APPOINTMENT OF THE PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE AND THE IDENTITY OF THE ESTATE'S ATTORNEY? 
Applicable Standard of Review: Judgments rendered as a 
matter of law by the lower court are basically reviewed de novo 
on appeal. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. Blom-
quist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis National 
Bank., 737 P.2d 225 (Utah 1987). 
APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
S75-3-801 (U.C.A. 1975): Notice to creditors. Unless 
notice has already been given under this section, a personal 
representative upon his appointment shall publish a notice 
once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of 
general circulation in the county announcing his appointment 
and address and notifying creditors of the estate to present 
their claims within three months after the date of the first 
publication of the notice or be forever barred. 
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, SI. [Citizenship - Due process 
of law - Equal protection.] All persons born or naturalized 
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of laws. 
Utah Const. Art. I, S7. [Due process of law.] No 
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Glenn C. Anderson, Jr. (Anderson) died on July 19, 1987. On 
August 12, 1987 Anderson's will was filed for probate. By 
October, 1987 Anderson's personal representative and his former 
attorney had both orally informed Charter of Anderson's probate, 
the appointment of the personal representative and the identity 
of the estate's attorney. The required statutory notice was 
published and proof of publication was filed on September 24, 
1987. Other creditors filed claims in 1987 and 1988. Charter 
did not file its claim until March, 1990 which claim was rejected 
by the personal representative and then by the lower court. 
Although there was no actual trial and there was no dispute of 
material fact, the lower court entered findings of fact, con-
clusions of law and the final order. The district court denied 
Charter's claim because Charter had actual notice of Anderson's 
death, the probate, and the appointment of the personal represen-
tative, and because the personal representative had complied with 
all the requirements of Section 75-3-801 (U.C.A. 1975), the 
probate notice statute then in force. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Anderson died on July 19, 1987. (R. 5) 
2. Probate was commenced on August 12, 1987 (R. 5) and 
Shelley Jones (Jones) was appointed personal representative of 
Anderson's estate. (R. 12) 
3. Thereafter, notice to creditors was published and 
completed in 1987 under the applicable notice statute, §75-3-801 
3 
(U.C.A. 1975). (The statute was amended in 1989 to require 
individual written notice to known creditors.) 
4. Some creditors filed claims against the estate in 1987 
and 1988. (R. 26, 27) 
5. During the period of publication, Jones talked on 
several occasions to representatives of Charter and informed 
Charter of Anderson's death, the probate, and her appointment as 
personal representative. (R. 70) 
6. During August, 1987 a representative of Charter also 
contacted Anderson's former attorney, Walter P. Faber, Jr., who 
then informed Charter of the probate, the appointment of Jones 
and the identity of S. Dee Long, the attorney for the estate. 
(R. 72) 
7. Jones did not give Charter any other notice. 
8. Charter first filed a claim against Anderson's estate in 
March, 1990. (R. 28) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
In 1987, Jones fully complied with the probate notice 
statute (§75-3-801) then in effect and gave Charter actual oral 
notice of the probate and her appointment. The above information 
was also given to Charter by Anderson's former attorney in 
August, 1987 plus the identity of the estate's attorney, S. Dee 
Long,in a call initiated by Charter. Because Charter was given 
actual as well as the required statutory notice, Charter was not 
deprived of due process even though Charter did not receive 
individual written notice of the three month period for present-
ing its claim. 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE JONES FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE APPLICABLE 
NOTICE STATUTE AND IN 1987 GAVE CHARTER ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE 
PROBATE AND HER APPOINTMENT AND CHARTER WAS ALSO INFORMED OF 
THE IDENTITY OF THE ESTATE'S ATTORNEY, THERE WAS NO VIOLA-
TION OF CHARTER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS. 
The only substantive issue in this case is whether Charter 
was denied due process because although Charter received actual 
and timely notice of the probate, it did not receive individual 
written notice to present its claim. There is no dispute that 
Charter had actual notice of the probate, the appointment of 
Jones, and the identity of the estate's attorney prior to the 
completion of the required statutory notice period. Charter thus 
had statutory as well as ample direct oral notice, and the 
knowledge and opportunity to file its claim well within the three 
month statutory claim period. However, Charter's position is 
that under the Due Process Clause it was entitled to personal 
written notice (as is now required by the statutory provision 
enacted two years later in 1989) to present its claim before such 
claim need have been filed regardless that it had actual notice 
and the notice statute then in effect was fully complied with by 
Jones. 
Charter principally bases its argument on the recent United 
States Supreme Court case of Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U. S. 478, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988), 
wherein the Supreme Court held that Oklahoma probate proceedings 
were State action and that the creditor therein was thus entitled 
to reasonable actual notice under the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution. The Oklahoma statute provided that 
5 
creditors must present claims within two months after publication 
or be forever barred. In the Pope case, the creditor had no 
actual notice of the probate during the two month period and 
therefore did not present a claim during that period. The 
Supreme Court in the Pope case does not prescribe the type or 
extent of the notice that should be given to comply with due 
process in probate cases where State action is involved, but 
states that "whether a particular method of notice is reasonable 
depends on the particular circumstances." 108 S.Ct. at 1344. 
In the Pope case, after an extended discussion of examples 
of State actions wherein the Due Process Clause becomes ap-
plicable, the Supreme Court stated in regard to Oklahoma's 
probate non-claim statute that: 
. . . the Due Process Clause requires that Appellant [the 
creditor] be given "[n]otice by mail or other means as 
certain to insure actual notice." Mennonite, supra. at 800, 
103 S.Ct., at 2712. 
The Supreme Court in the Pope case cited two of its earlier 
decisions, Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 
306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennonite Board of 
Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 77 L.Ed.2d 180 
(1983) in regard to due process considerations in cases of notice 
by publication. In the Mennonite case the Supreme Court quoted 
its decision in the Mullane case and stated that where there is 
State action . . . "notice [must be] reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present 
their objections." . . . 103 S.Ct. @ 2709. 
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It is undisputed in this case that Charter had actual notice 
from at least two sources of the commencement of the probate 
proceedings, the appointment of the personal representative, and 
the identity of the estate's attorney at the beginning of the 
statutory notice period. It is also undisputed that Charter 
initiated the contact in August, 1987 with the decedent's former 
attorney wherein Charter received the information on which it 
could easily have filed a claim within the statutory period if it 
had chosen to do so. Under the facts of this case, Charter was 
given reasonable actual notice prior to the time the statutory 
notice period began, and therefore the oral notice given was 
reasonable and fulfilled all due process requirements as stated 
by the Supreme Court in the Pope, Mennonite and Mullane cases. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Charter had actual notice as well as the statutory 
notice required at the time, the lower court properly determined 
that under the undisputed facts there was no additional notice 
required and Charter was not deprived of due process. The 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. 
DATED this <XD day of May, 1991. 
s sy* /y^L y£&K*~ ^ 
S. DEE LONG ^7 \/J 
Attorney for Appellee\y 
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Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copper State Thrift & Loan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, : FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, : 
JR. , 97Pt<H>yt(* 
: Probate No. P-87-816 
Deceased. Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The Petition of Allowance of Claim of Charter Thrift & Loan 
against the estate of the above-named Decedent, and the Personal 
Representative's denial of that claim came on for hearing on the 
25th day of July, 1990, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson presiding. 
Creditor Charter Thrift & Loan appeared through their counsel, Mark 
S. Swan of the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C., and the 
Personal Representative appeared through her counsel, S. Dee Long. 
The Court having considered the memoranda and affidavits submitted 
by the various parties, and being fully advised herein, now makes 
its: 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP - 4 1990 
DMutvCtoffc 
ticnm 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Decedent, Glenn Claughton Anderson, Jr., died on the 
19th day of July, 1987 and was a resident of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. 
2. A probate was filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah on the 12th day of August, 1987, 
for the probate of Decedent's Will. 
3. Decedentfs daughter, Shelly J. Jones, was appointed 
Personal Representative of said estate. 
4. Said Personal Representative caused a notice to creditors 
to be published for three (3) consecutive weeks in accordance with 
Utah Code Annotated, §75-3-801. 
5. Said Personal Representative, Shelly J. Jones, personally 
contacted Charter Thrift & Loan by telephone and informed him of 
her father's death, and that a probate had been filed, and that she 
had been appointed Personal Representative of her father's estate. 
6. Charter Thrift & Loan did not have actual notice of the 
publication of the Notice to creditors to submit claims nor actual 
notice of the running of the claim bar period. 
7. Charter Thrift & Loan did not file a creditor's claim 
within the three (3) months of publication as required by U.C.A., 
§75-3-801, and did not file a creditor's claim until March 1, 1990. 
From the forgoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
inters its: 
C008S 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction of both the parties and the 
subject matter. 
2. The Personal Representative of the estate met all 
requirements of the Utah Uniform Probate Code in giving notice to 
creditors. 
3. The constitutional due process rights of the creditor, 
Charter Thrift & Loan, were not violated because said creditor had 
received actual notice of the Decedentfs death, the filing of the 
probate, and the appointment of Shelly J. Jones as Personal 
Representative. 
4. The creditor's claim of Charter Thrift & Loan was not 
made within the statutory three month time period of the date of 
first publication of notice to creditors as required by law, and 
is thus forever barred against the estate, the personal 
representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent. 
DATED this I day of August, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
S. Dee Long (7y gn^ezr v 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
G00c 
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Shelley J. Jones, Personal Representative 
2939 Brookburn Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Dee Long 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
/^<^j\^^^ ^ 
Ch730700.c90 
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A Professional Corporation 
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Telephone: (801)539-8632 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Copper State Thrift & Loan 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF, 
GLENS CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, 
JR. , 
Deceased. Judge Homer Wilkinson 
The hearing on the Petition of Charter Thrift & Loan for 
Allowance of Claims, and the denial of said claim by the Personal 
Representative of the estate, came on for hearing on the 25th day 
of July, 1990, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. Chartcr 
Thrift & Loan appeared by and through its counsel, Mark S. Swan of 
the law firm RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. The Personal 
Representative of the estate appeared through her counsel and 
counsel for the estate, S. Dee Long. The Court having considered 
all documents on file herein, having reviewed the memoranda and 
affidavits submitted by the parties, having heard argument of 
counsel, having heretofore signed and filed its Findings of Fact 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
S E P - 4 1990 
DeoutvCler* 
U K U L K 
p7$ ??V ?l 4 
Probate No. P-87-816 
and Conclusions of Law, and being otherwise fully advised in the 
premises, it is hereby: 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the creditor's claim of 
Charter Thrift & Loan against the above-named Decedent's estate is 
hereby disallowed and forever barred against the estate, the 
Personal Representative and the heirs and devisees of the decedent. 
DATED this ( day ofAu^at, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
-—/L wCC 
e Long 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fr day of August, 1990, J 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon 
the following parties by placing the same in the United States 
Mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Shelley J. Jones, Personal Representative 
2939 Brookburn Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
S. Dee Long 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Attorney for Personal Representative 
ch730700.c90 
/ y ^ A.^4-4. 
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S. DEE LONG (A1990) 
Attorney at Law 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 8*1109 
Telephone: 486-5634 
FILED OlSTMCrcSuitT 
Third Judicial District 
JUL 17 1990 
Dootitv Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GLENN CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, JR., 
Deceased. 
AFFIDAVIT %*\~ S U 
Probate No.- £97816-
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SHELLEY J. JONES, being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. Following my father's death I had several conversations 
with representatives of Charter Thrift & Loan. 
2. In some of those telephone conversations I specifically 
stated to said representatives that my father's estate had been 
placed in probate and that I had been appointed the Personal Represen-
tative of the estate. 
3. These telephone conversations wherein I indicated that 
I was a Personal Representative took place within two months of my 
father's death. 
DATED this \jc day of July, 1990. 
SHELLS J.JONE^) 
-2-
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned Notary 
Public, SHELLEY J. JONES, who after first being sworn stated that 
she has read the foregoing and that the contents thereof are true to 
the best of her own personal knowledge and belief , and she then 
signed the same in my presence this /tym day of July> 1990. 
^ < CflZ) 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
Residing a t : J^</j <C& 
T 
CJ 
Notary Public ; 
BARBARA W THURGOOD I 
2102 East 3300 South i 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
My Commission Expires I 
November 10 1992 I 
State of Utah | 
S. DEE LONG (A1990) 
Attorney at Law 
2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84109 
Telephone: 486-5634 
Third !tir»i/>.j<»i District 
JUL 17 1990 
$* &£i iff" ~it£lt/As 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF: 
GLENN CLAUGHTON ANDERSON, JR., 
Deceased. 
AFFIDAVIT .. 
Probate No. Wf$±& * ' ^ 
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) s s 
COUNTY OP SALT LAKE ) 
WALTER P. PABER, JR., being first duly sworn, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. Affiant is an attorney licensed to practice in the 
State of Utah, 
2. I was legal counsel for Glenn Claughton Anderson, 
Jr. prior to his death. 
3. Following the death of Mr. Anderson on July 19, 1987 
I had telephone conversations with representatives of Charter Thrift 
& Loan who telephoned in August, 1987 wherein I informed them that 
Mr. Anderson's estate had been placed in probate, that Shelley 
J. Jones had been appointed the Personal Representative of the 
estate, and that S. Dee Long was the attorney for the estate. 
DATED this /^' day of July, 1990-
-2-
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned Notary Public, 
WALTER P. PABER, JR., who after first bei* - sworn stated that he has 
read the foregoing and that the contents thereof are true to the best 
of his personal knowledge and belief , and he then signed the same in 
my presence this day of July, 1990 
;> 
My Commission Expires 
v/o ((( <a c <^J / s?a < [fVCs1 
^Totary Public 




2102 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
My Commission Expires 
November 10 1992 
State of Utah 
1340 108 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 
will derive any solace from the knowledge 
that although the practice of their religion 
will become "more difficult" as a result lA 
the Government's actions, they remain free 
to maintain their religious beliefs. Given 
today's ruling, that freedom amounts to 
nothing more than the right to believe that 
their religion will be destroyed. The safe-
guarding of such a hollow freedom not only 
makes a mockery of the " 'policy of the 
United States to protect and preserve for 
American Indians their inherent right of 
freedom to believe, express, and exercise 
the[ir] traditional religions/" ante at, 
1327-1328 (quoting AIRFA), it fails utterly 
to accord with the dictates of the First 
Amendment. 
I dissent. 
TULSA PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION 
SERVICES, INC., Appellant 
v. 
reasonably ascertainable creditors of est 
that noncjaim statute had began to r 
Reversed and remanded. 
Justice Biackmun concurred in res 
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented ; 
filed opinion. 
1. Constitutional Law *»277U) 
Creditor's cause of action against d< 
dent's estate for unpaid bill is protec 
property interest, for due process \ 
poses. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
2. Constitutional Law *=>254(2, 4) 
Fourteenth Amendment only proU 
property interests from deprivation 
state action; private use of state s< 
tioned private remedies or procedures d 
not rise to level of state action, but w 
private parties make use of state pr« 
dures with overt, significant assistance 
state officials, state action may be foi 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
3. Constitutional Law <S=»30S 
Due process does not require that 
tential plaintiffs be given notice of imp* 
ing expiration of period of limitati* 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 14. 
4. Constitutional Law *»254(2) 
Executors and Administrators $»2 
Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is 
self-executing, in that probate court's 
volvement in appointing executor is ne 
sary to activate time bar, and thus tl 
was sufficient state action to give rise 
due process requirement of actual mail 
tice to known or reasonably ascertain; 
creditors, rather than mere notice by pi 
cation, which was sufficient only for cr 
tors who are not reasonably ascertain: 
or who held merely conjectural claims. 
O.S.1981, §§ 381, 383; U.S.C.A. Co 
Amend. 14. 
Syllabus# 
Under the nonclaim provision of C 
homa's probate code, creditors' ck 
JoAnne POPE, Executrix of the Estate of 
H. Everett Pope, Jr., Deceased. 
No. 86-1961. 
Argued March 2, 1988. 
Decided April 19, 1988. 
Creditor's assignee instituted suit to 
compel estate's payment of expenses of 
decedent's last illness. The District Court, 
Tulsa County, Robert D. Frank, J., held 
claim was time barred, and assignee ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, 
and assignee sought review. The Okla-
homa Supreme Court, 733 P.2d 3%, Laven-
der, J., affirmed, and assignee appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor, held 
that due process required actual notice to 
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the 
TULSA PROFESSIONAL COLLECTION SERVICES v. POPE 1341 
CtUMtOS S.Ct. 1340 (IMS) 
against an estate are generally barred un-
less they are presented to the executor or 
executrix within two months of the publica-
tion of notice of the commencement of pro-
bate proceedings. Appellee executrix pub-
lished the required notice in compliance 
with the terms of the nonclaim statute and 
i probate court order, but appellant, the 
assignee of a hospital's claim for expenses 
connected with the decedent's final illness, 
failed to file a timely claim. For this rea-
son, the probate court denied appellant's 
application for payment, and both the State 
Court of Appeals and Supreme Court af-
firmed, rejecting apoellant's contention 
that, in failing to req~.re more than publi-
cation notice, the nonciaim statute violated 
due process. That contention was based 
upon Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank 
and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct 652, 
94 LEd. 865, which Md that state action 
that adversely affecfi aroperty interests 
roust be accompanied ay such notice as is 
reasonable under the particular circum-
stances, balancing the State's interest and 
the due process interests of individuals, 
and Mennonite Board of Missions v. 
Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 103 S.Ct 2706, 77 
LEd.2d 180, which generally requires actu-_ 
al noticjLto an affected party whose name 
and address are "reasonably ascertain-
able." 
Held: If appellant's identity as a credi-
tor was known or "reasonably ascertain-
able" by appellee (a fact which cannot be 
determined from the present record), the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as interpreted by Mullane 
and Mennonite, requires that appellant be 
given notice by mail or such other means 
as is certain tq ensure actual flQflre, Ap-
pellant's claim is properly considered a 
property interest protected by the Clause. 
Moreover, the nonclaim statute is not sim-
ply a self-exectting statute of limitations. 
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 102 
S.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738, distinguished. 
Rather, the probate court's intimate in-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
reader. Sec United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 
volvement throughout the probate proceed-
ings—particularly the court's activation of 
the statute's time bar by the appointment 
of an executor or executrix—is so perva-
sive and substantial that it must be con-
sidered state action. Nor can there be any 
doubt that the statute may "adversely af-
fect" protected property interests, since un-
timely claims such as appellant's are com-
pletely extinguished. On balance, satisfy-
ing creditors' substantial, practical need for 
actual notice in the probate setting is not 
so cumbersome or impracticable as to un-
duly burden the State's undeniably legit-
imate interest in the expeditious resolution 
of the proceedings, sine* mail service 
(which is already routinely provided at sev-
eral points in the probate process) is inex-
pensive, efficient, and reasonably calculat-
ed to provide actual notice, and since publi-
cation notice will suffice for creditors 
whose identities are not ascertainable by 
reasonably diligent efforts or whose claims 
are merely conjectural. Pp. 1344-1348. 
733 P.2d 396 (Okl.1986), reversed and 
remanded. 
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion 
of the Court, in which BRENNAN, 
WHITE, MARSHALL, STEVENS, SCA-
LIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. BLACK-
MUN, J., concurred in the result. REHN-
QUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Randall E. Rose, Tulsa, Okl., for appel-
lant. 
Phillip K. Smith, Tulsa, Okl., for appel-
lee. 
Justice O'CONNOR delivered the 
opinion of the Court. 
This case involves a provision of Okla-
homa's probate laws requiring claims "aris-
ing upon a contract" generally to be 
presented to the executor or executrix of 
the estate within 2 months of the publica-
tion of a notice advising creditors of the 
commencement of probate proceedings. 
200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
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OkhuStat, Tit 58, 5 338 (1981). The ques-
tion presented is whether this provision of 
notice solely by publication satisfies the 
Due Process Clause. 
I 
Oklahoma's probate code requires credi-
tors to file claims against an « state within 
a specified time period, and generally bars 
untimely claims. Ibid Such "nonclaim 
statutes" are almost universally included in 
state probate codes. See Uniform Probate 
Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); Falen-
der, Notice to Creditors in Estate Proceed-
ings: What Process is Due?, 63 N.C.L.Rev. 
659, 667-668 (1985). Giving creditors a lim-
ited time in which to file claims against the 
estate serves the State's interest in facili-
tating the administration and expeditious 
closing of estates. See, e.g., State ex rel 
Central State Griffin Memorial Hospital 
v. Reea\ 493 P.2d 815, 818 (Okla.1972). 
Nonclaim statutes come in two basic forms. 
Some provide a relatively short time period, 
generally 2 to 6 months, that begins to run 
after the commencement of probate pro-
ceedings. Others call for a longer period, 
generally 1 to 5 years, that runs from the 
decedent's death. See Falender, supra, at 
664-672. Most States include both types of 
nonclaim statutes in their probate codes, 
typically providing that if probate proceed-
ings are not commenced and the shorter 
period therefore never is triggered, then 
claims nonetheless may be barred by the 
longer period. See, e.g.t Ark.Code Ann. 
§ 28-50-101(a), (d) (1987) (3 months if pro-
bate proceedings commenced; 5 years if 
not); Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a)(l), (2) 
(1979) (4 months; 3 years); Mo.Rev.Stat. 
§ 473.360(1), (3) (1986) (6 months; 3 years). 
Most States also provide that creditors are 
to be notified of the requirement to file 
claims imposed by the nonclaim statutes 
solely by publication. See Uniform Pro-
bate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); 
Falender, supra, at 660, n. 7 (collecting 
statutes). Indeed, in most jurisdictions it is 
the publication of notice that triggers the 
nonclaim statute. The Uniform Probate 
Code, for example, provides that crediton 
have 4 months from publication in which to 
file claims. Uniform Probate Code 
§ 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983). See also, «.*, 
Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 14-3801 (1975); FTa. 
Stat § 733.701 (1987); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-801 (x978). 
The specific nonclaim statute at issue in 
this case, Okla.Stat, Tit. 58, § 333 (1981), 
provides for only a short time period and is 
best considered in the context of Oklahoma 
probate proceedings as a whole. Under 
Oklahoma's probate code, any party inter 
ested in the estate may initiate probate 
proceedings by petitioning the court to 
have the will proved. § 22. Tift court is 
then required to set a hearing date on the 
petition, § 25, and to mail notice of the 
hearing "to all heirs, legatees and devisees, 
at their places of residence," §§ 25, 26. If 
no person appears at the hearing to contest 
the will, the court may admit the will to 
probate on the testimony of one of the 
subscribing witnesses to the will. § 30. 
After the will is admitted to probate, the 
court must order appointment of an execu-
tor or executrix, issuing letters testamenta-
ry to the named executor or executrix if 
that person appears, is competent and qual-
ified, and no objections are made. § 101. 
Immediately after appointment, the exec-
utor or executrix is required to "give notice 
to the creditors of the deceased." § 331. 
Proof of compliance with this requirement 
must be filed with the court. § 332. This 
notice is to advise creditors that they must 
present their claims to the executor or ex-
ecutrix within 2 months of the date of the 
first publication. As for the method of 
notice, the statute requires only publica-
tion: "[S]uch notice must be published in 
some newspaper in [the] county once each 
week for two (2) consecutive weeks." 
§ 331. A creditor's failure to file a claim 
within the 2-month period generally bars it 
forever. § 333. The nonclaim statute does 
provide certain exceptions, however. If the 
creditor is out of State, then a claim "may 
be presented at any time before a decree of 
distribution is entered." § 333. Mortgag-
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m and debts not yet due are also excepted 
from the 2-month time limit 
This shorter type of nonclaim statute is 
the only one included in Oklahoma's pro-
bite code. Delays in commencement of 
probate proceedings are dealt with not 
through some independent, longer period 
running from the decedent's death, see, 
e*, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-50-101(d) (1987), 
bat by shortening the notice period once 
proceedings have started. Section 331 pro-
rides that if the decedent has been dead for 
more than 5 years, then creditors have only 
1 month after notice is published in which 
to file their claims. A similar 1-month 
period applies if the decedent was intestate. 
f 331. 
II 
H. Everett Pope, Jr. was admitted to St 
John Medical Center, a hospital in Tulsa, 
Oklahoma, in November 1978. On April 2, 
1979, while still at the hospital, he died 
testate. His wife, appellee JoAnne Pope, 
initiated probate proceedings in the District 
fom*-ji£ T"lsa County in accordance with 
the statutory scheme outlined above. The 
court entered an order setting a hearing. 
Record 8. After the hearing the court 
entered an order Emitting the will to pro-
bite and, following the designation in the 
will, id, at 2, named appellee as the execu-
trix of the estate. Id, at 12. Letters 
testamentary were issued, id., at 13, and 
the court ordered appellee to fulfill her 
ttttutory obligation by directing that she 
"immediately give notice to creditors." Id, 
it 14. Appellee published notice in the 
Tttisa Daily Legal News for 2 consecutive 
weeks beginning July 17,1979. The notice 
idrised creditors that they must file any 
diim they had against the estate within 2 
aonths of the first publication of the no-
tice. Id, at 16. 
Appellant Tulsa Professional Collection 
Services, Inc., is a subsidiary of St John 
Medical Center and the assignee of a claim 
for expenses connected with the decedent's 
bog stay at that hospital. Neither appel-
kat, nor its parent company, filed a claim 
with appellee within the 2-month time peri-
od following publication of notice. In Octo-
ber 1983, however, appellant filed an Appli-
cation for Order Compelling Payment of 
Expenses of Last Illness, Id, at 28. In 
making this application, appellant relied on 
Okla. Stat, Tit. 58, § 594 (1981), which 
indicates that an executrix "must pay . . . 
the expenses of the last sickness." Appel-
lant argued that this specific statutory 
command made compliance with the 2-
month deadline for filing claims unneces-
sary. The District Court of Tulsa County 
rejected this contention, ruling that even 
claims pursuant to § 594 fell within the 
general requirements of the nonclaim stat-
ute. Accordingly, the court denied appel-
lant's application. App. 3. 
The District Court's reading of g 594's 
relationship to the nonclaim statute was 
attirmecl by the Oklahoma Court of Ap-
peals. App. 7. Appellant then sought re-
hearing, arguing for the first time that the 
nonclaim statute's notice provisions violat-
ed due process. In a supplemental opinion 
on rehearing the Court of Appeals rejected 
the due process claim on the merits. Id, at 
15. 
Appellant next sought review in the Su-
preme Court of Oklahoma. That court 
granted certiorari and nf^r rpvigiiTof frith 
the § 594 n^cj due procesaJssues. affirmed 
theTburt^^pjreals' judgment With re-
spect to the federal issue, the court relied 
on Estate of Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan 
Clinic, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 86, 88-89 (Mo. 
1985), to reject appellant's contention that 
our decisions in Mullane v. Central Hano-
ver Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 
S.Ct 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), and Mennon-
ite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 
791, 103 S.Ct 2706, 77 LEd.2d 180 (1983), 
required more than publication notice. 733 
P.2d 396 (1987). The Supreme Court rea-
soned that the function of notice in probate 
proceedings was not to " 'make a creditor a 
party to the proceeding'" but merely to 
" *notif[y] him that he may become one if 
he wishes.' " Id., at 400 (quoting Estate of 
Busch, 700 S.W.2d, at 88). In addition, the 
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court distinguished probate proceedings be-
cause they do not directly adjudicate the 
creditor's claims. 733 P.2d, at 400-401. 
Finally, the court agreed with Estate of 
Busch that nonclaim statutes were self-ex-
ecuting statutes of limitations, because 
they "ac[t] to cut off potential claims 
against the decedent's estate by the pas-
sage of time," and accordingly do not re-
quire actual notice. 738 P.2d, at 401. See 
also Gibbs v. Estate o/Dolan, 146 Ill.App. 
3d 203, 100 Ill.Dec. 61, 496 N.E.2d 1126 
(1986) (rejecting due process challenge to 
nonclaim statute); Gano Farms, Inc. v. 
Estate ofKleweno, 2 Kan.App.2d 506, 582 
P.2d 742 (1978) (same); Chalaby v. Dris-
kell, 237 Or. 245, 390 P.2d 632 (1964) 
(same); William B. Tanner Co. v. Estate 
ofFessler, 100 Wis.2d 437, 302 N.W.2d 414 
(1981) (same); New York Merchandise Co. 
v. Stout, 43 Wash.2d 825, 264 P.2d 868 
(1953) (same). This conclusion conflicted 
with that reached by the Nevada Supreme 
Court in Continental Insurance Co. v. 
Moseley, 100 Nev. 337, 683 P.2d 20 (1984), 
after our decision remanding the case for 
reconsideration in light of Mennonite, su-
pra. 463 U.S. 1202, 103 S.Ct 3530, 77 
LEd.2d 1383 (1983). In Moseley, the Neva-
da Supreme Court held that in this context 
due process required "more than service by 
publication." Id., at 338, 683 P.2d, at 21. 
Wft nftted probable lurisdictfon. 484 U.S. 
- — , 108 S.Ct 62, 98 L.Ed.2d 26 (1987), and 
now reverse and remand. 
HI 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S., at 314, 70 S.Ct, 
at 657, established that state action affect-
ing property must generally be accompa-
nied by notification of that action: "An 
elementary and fundamental requirement 
of due process in any proceeding which is 
to be accorded finality is notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to 
apprise interested parties of the pendency 
of the action and afford them an opportuni-
ty to present their objections." In the 
years since Mullane the Court has adhered 
to these principles, balancing the "interest 
of the State" and "the individual interest 
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment" Ibid. The focus is on the 
reasonableness of the balance, and, as Mul 
lane itself made clear, whether a particular 
metnoQ of n o f e fo f^lgpn&ble jjepend8"l)n 
the particular circumstances. 
The Court's most recent decision in this 
area is Mennonite, supra, which involved 
the sale of real property for delinquent 
taxes. State law provided for tax sales in 
certain circumstances and for a 2-year pe-
riod following any such sale during which 
the owner or any lienholder could redeem 
the property. After expiration of the re-
demption period, the tax sale purchaser 
could apply for a deed. The property own-
er received actual notice of the tax sale and 
the redemption period. All other interested 
parties were given notice by publication. 
462 U.S., at 792-794, 103 S.Ct, at 2708-
2709. In Mennonite, a mortgagee of prop-
erty that had been sold and on which the 
redemption period had run complained that 
the State's failure to provide it with actual 
notice of these proceedings violated due 
process. The Court agreed, holding that 
"actual notice is a minimum constitutional 
precondition to a proceeding wjfijcfr wflTJd* 
verseiv aflyct tKe IIKPI^ Y gr BJfP^Y int** 
ests of any party. w t^fi<>r iin1o»t^ p>H $? 
well versed in commerqa| practice, if its 
name and address are reasonably ascertain-
able." Id., at 800, 103 S.Ct, at 2712 (em-
"phasis in original). Because the tax sale 
had "immediately and drastically dimin-
ishe[d] the value of [the mortgagee's] inter-
est," id., at 798, 103 S.Ct, at 2711, and 
because the mortgagee could have been 
identified through "reasonably diligent ef-
forts," id., at 798, n. 4, 103 S.Ct, at 2711, 
n. 4, the Court concluded that due process 
required that the mortgagee be given actu-
al notice. 
[1] Applying these principles to the 
cjmg ^ foand leads to a similar result Ap-
pellant's interest is an unsecured claim, a. 
cause of action against the estafr fo[M 
unpaid bill. Little doubt remains that such 
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in intangible interest is property protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment As we 
wrote in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 
466 U.S. 422, 428, 102 S.Ct 1148, 1154, 71 
L£d.2d 265 (1982), this question "was af-
firmatively settled by the Mullane case 
itself, where the Court held that a cause of 
action IB a species of property protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause." In Logan, the Court held that a 
cause of action under Illinois' Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act was a protected proper-
ty interest, and referred to the numerous 
other types of claims that the Court had 
previously recognized as deserving due pro-
cess protection See id, at 429-431, and 
on. 4-5, 102 S.Ct, at 1154-1155, and nn. 
4-5. Appellant's claim, therefore, is prop-
erly considered a protected property inter-
est 
[2] The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects this interest, however, only from a 
deprivation by state action. Private use of 
state sanctioned private remedies or proce-
dures does not rise to the level of state 
•etion. See, e.g.f Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct 1729, 56 
LEd.2d 185 (1978). Nor is the State's in-
volvement in the mere running of a general 
statute of limitation generally sufficient to 
implicate due process. See Texaco, Inc. v. 
asrfU54 U.S. 516, 102 S.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed. 
M738 (1982). See also Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, supra, 436 U.S., at 166, 98 S.Ct, at 
1738. But when private parties make use 
of state procedures with the ftvert siy^jfi-
qnt assistance of state officials, state ac-
tion npY fre found. See, e.g., Lugar v. 
Bdmondson Oil C», 457 U.S. 922, 102 
S.Ct 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Snia-
isch v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 
87, 89 S.Ct 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969). 
fte Question here is whfith*r tJu> StutVa 
involvement with the nonclaim statute is 
substantial enough to implicate the Due 
ftocessClause. 
(31 Appellee argues that it is not, con-
tending that Oklahoma's nonclaim statute 
is i self-executing statute of limitations. 
Belying on this characterization, appellee 
tOSASCt—17 
then points to Short, supra. Appellee's 
reading of Short is correct—due process 
does not require that potential plaintiffs be 
given notice of the impending expiration of 
a period of limitations—but in our view, 
appellee's premise is not Oklahoma's non-
claim statute is not a self-executing statute 
of limitations. 
It is true that nonclaim statutes general-
ly possess some attributes of statutes of 
limitations. They provide a specific time 
period within which particular types of 
claims must be filed and they bar claims 
presented after expiration of that deadline. 
Many of the state court decisions upholding 
nonclaim statutes against due process chal-
lenges have relied upon these features and 
concluded that they are properly viewed as 
statutes of limitations. See, e.g., Estate of 
Busch v. Ferrell-Duncan Clinic, Inc., 700 
S.W.2d, at 89; William B. Tanner Co. v. 
Estate of Fessler, 100 Wis.2d 437, 302 
N.W.2d 414 (1981). 
As we noted in Short, however, it is the 
"self-executing feature" of a statute of 
limitations that makes Mullane and Men-
nonite inapposite. See 454 U.S., at 533, 
536, 102 S.Ct, at 794, 796. The State's 
interest in a self-executing statute of limi-
tations is in providing repose for potential 
- defendants and in avoiding stale claims. 
The State has no role to play beyond enact-
ment of the limitations period. While this 
enactment obviously is state action, the 
State's limited involvement in the running 
of the time period generally falls short of 
constituting the type of state action re-
quired to implicate the protections of the 
Due Process Clause. 
[4] Here, in contrast, there is signifi-
cant state action. The probate court is 
intimately involved throughout and with-
out that involvement the time bar is never 
activated. The nonclaim statute becomes 
operative only after probate proceedings 
have been commenced in state court. The 
court must appoint the executor or execu-
trix before notice, which triggers the time 
bar, can be given. Only after this court 
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appointment is made does the statute pro-
vide for any notice; § 331 directs the exec-
utor or executrix to publish notice "immedi-
ately" after appointment Indeed, in this 
case, the District Court reinforced the stat-
utory command with an order expressly 
requiring appellee to "immediately give no-
tice to creditors." The form of the order 
indicates that such orders are routine. 
Record 14. Finally, copies of the notice 
and an affidavit of publication must be 
filed with the court. § 332. It is only 
after all of these actions take place that the 
time period begins to run, and in every one 
of these actions, the court is intimately 
involved. This involvement is so pervasive 
and substantial that it must be considered 
state action subject to the restrictions of 
the Fourteenth Amendment 
Where the legal proceedings themselves 
trigger the time bar, even if those proceed-
ings do not necessarily resolve the claim on 
its merits, the time bar lacks the self-execu-
ting feature that Short indicated was nec-
essary to remove any due process problem. 
Rather, in such circumstances, due process 
is directly implicated and actual notice gen-
erally is required. Cf. Mennonite, 462 
U.S., at 793-794, 103 S.Ct, at 2708-2709 
(tax sale proceedings trigger 2-year re-
demption period); Logan v. Zimmerman 
Brush Co., supra, 455 U.S., at 433, 437, 
102 S.Ct, at 1156, 1158 (claim barred if no 
hearing held 120 days after action com-
menced); City of New York v. New York, 
N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 294, 73 S.Ct 
299, 300, 97 L.Ed. 333 (1953) (bankruptcy 
proceedings trigger specific time period in 
which creditors' claims must be filed). Our 
conclusion that the Oklahoma nonclaim 
statute is not a self-executing statute of 
limitations makes it unnecessary to consid-
er appellant's argument that a 2-month 
period is somehow unconstitutionally short. 
See Tr. of Oral Arg. 22 (advocating consti-
tutional requirement that the States pro-
vide at least 1 year). We also have no 
occasion to consider the proper character-
ization of nonclaim statutes that run from 
the date of death, and which generally pro-
vide for longer time periods, ranging fan 
1 to 5 years. See Falender, 68 N.C;L.Rer, 
at 667-669. In sum, the substantial in-
volvement of the probate court throughout 
the process leaves little doubt that the run* 
ning of Oklahoma's nonclaim statute is •* 
companied by sufficient government actios 
to implicate the Due Process Clause. 
Nor can there be any doubt that the 
nonclaim statute may "adversely affect" i 
protected property interest In appellant's 
case, such an adverse affect is all too clour. 
The entire purpose and effect of the no* 
claim statute is to regulate the timeliness 
of such claims and to forever bar untimely 
claims, and by virtue of the statute, the 
probate proceedings themselves have com-
pletely extinguished appellant's claim. 
Thus, it is irrelevant that the notice seeks 
only to advise creditors that they may be* 
come parties rather than that they are ptr> 
ties, for if they do not participate in tin 
probate proceedings, the nonclaim statute 
terminates their property interests. It is 
not necessary for a proceeding to directly 
adjudicate the merits of a claim in order to 
"adversely affect" that interest In Men-
nonite itself, the tax sale proceedings did 
not address the merits of the mortgagee's 
claim. Indeed, the tax sale did not eves 
completely extinguish that claim, it merefr 
"diminishefd] the value" of the interest 
462 U.S., at 798, 103 S.Ct, at 2711. Y* 
the Court held that due process required 
that the mortgagee be given actual noties 
of the tax sale. See also Memphis Light 
Gas A Water Division v. Craft, 436 U M 
98 S.Ct 1554, 56 LEd.2d 30 (1978) (tam 
nation of utility service); Schroeder v. City 
of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 83 S.Ct 279,1 
L.Ed.2d 255 (1962) (condemnation proceed* 
ing); City of New York v. New York, NM. 
& H.R. Co., supra (bankruptcy code's re-
quirement of "reasonabljknotice" requirss 
actual notice of deadline for filing claims). 
In assessing the propriety of actual no-
tice in this context consideration should be 
given to the practicalities of the situatMi 
and the effect that requiring actual not» 
mav hav<f on important state interests, 
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Hennmite, supra, 462 U.S., at 798-799, 
108 S.Ct, at 2711-2712; Mullane, 839 U.S., 
It 813-314, 70 S.Ct, at 656-667. As the 
Court noted in Mullane, "[c]hance alone 
brings to the attention of even a local resi-
dent an advertisement in small type insert-
ed in the back pages of a newspaper." IdL, 
•t 815, 70 S.Ct, at 658. Creditors, who 
bve a strong interest in maintaining the 
integrity of their relationship with their 
debtors, are particularly unlikely to benefit 
from publication notice. Aq a claa^ credi-
may not be aware of a debtor's death 
er oFine institution ofjarobaite proceeding. 
Moreover, the executor or executrix will 
often be, as is the case here, a party with a 
beneficial interest in the estate. This could 
diminish an executor's or executrix's inqli; 
^ n l o " c a » atfentfrfl fo t h p pnti>ntiftI..PYpir 
i|gonjtLa creditors claim.. There is thus a 
substantial practical need for actual notice 
in this setting. 
At the same time, the State undeniably 
In a legitimate interest in the expeditious 
resolution of probate proceedings. Death 
transforms the decedent's legal relation* 
ihips and a State could reasonably con-
clude that swift settlement of estates is so 
important that it calls for very short time 
deadlines for filing claims. As noted, the 
ihnost uniform practice is to establish such 
ibort deadlines, and to provide only publi-
cation notice. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.StatAnn. 
§14-5801 (1975); Ark. Code Ann. 
f 28-50-101(a) (1987); Fla.Stat § 733.701 
(1987); Idaho Code § 15-3-803(a) (1979); 
Mo.Stat § 473.360(1) (1986); Utah Code 
Ann. $ 75-3-801 (1978). See also Uniform 
Probate Code § 3-801, 8 U.L.A. 351 (1983); 
Faknder, supra, at 660, n. 7 (collecting 
statutes). Providing actual notice to 
known or reasonably ascertainable credi-
tors, however, is not inconsistent with the 
foals reflected in nonclaim statutes. Actu-
al notice need not be inefficient or burden-
some. We have repeatedly recognized that 
mail service is an inexpensive ana etncient 
•qfflf ™W ^^}j_nu^tbly calculatedto 
provide actual notice. See, e.g., Mennon-
tie, supra, 462 U.sT, at 799, 800, 103 S.Ct, 
at 2711, 2712; Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 
444, 455, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d 
249 (1982); Mullane, supra, 339 U.S., at 
319, 70 S.Ct, at 659. In addition, Mullane 
disavowed any intent to require "impracti-
cable and extended searches . . . in the 
name of due process." 339 U.S., at 317-
318, 70 S.Ct, at 658-659. As the Court 
indicated in Mennonite, all that the execuP 
tor or MMUtrix heed do is make "reason-
ably diligent efforts," Wl U.S., at 7W, n. I, 
'IDS S.Ct, at 5?/II, h. 4, to uncover the 
"jfflffoH 0f Crftflfr11'*! For creditors who 
are not "reasonably ascertainable/' publi-
cation notice can suffice. Nor is everyone 
who may conceivably have a claim properly 
considered a creditor entitled to actual no-
tice. Here, as in Mullane, it is reasonable 
to dispense with actual notice to those with 
mere "conjectural" claims. 339 U.S., at 
317, 70 S.Ct, at 659. 
On balance then, a requirement of actual 
notice to known or reasonably ascertain-
able creditors is not so cumbersome as to 
unduly hinder the dispatch with which pro-
bate proceedings are conducted. Notice by 
mail is already routinely provided at sever-
al points in the probate process. In Okla-
homa, for example, § 26 requires that 
"heirs, legatees, and devisees" be mailed 
notice of the initial hearing on the will. 
Accord Uniform Probate Code § 3-403, 8 
U.L.A. 274 (1983). Indeed, a few States 
already provide for actual notice in connec-
tion with short nonclaim statutes. See, 
e.g., Calif. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 9050, 9100 
(Supp.1988); Nev.Rev.Stat §§ 147.010, 
155.010, 155.020 (1987); W.Va.Code §§ 44-
2-2, 44-2-4 (1982). We do not believe that 
requiring adherence to such a standard will 
be so burdensome or impracticable as to 
warrant reliance on publication notice 
alone. 
In analogous situations we have rejected 
similar arguments that a pressing need to 
proceed expeditiously justifies less than ac-
tual notice. For example, while we have 
recognized that in the bankruptcy context 
there is a noed for prompt administration 
of claims, United Savings Assn. of Texas 
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v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assoc., Ltd, 
484 U.S. , , 108 S.Ct 626, , 98 
L.Ed.2d 740 (1988), we also have required 
actual notice in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 87 
S.Ct 274, 17 L.Ed.2d 197 (1966); City of 
New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 
supra. See also Mullane v. Central Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., supra, 339 U.S., at 
318-319, 70 S.Ct, at 659 (trust proceed-
ings). Probate proceedings are not so dif-
ferent in kind that a different result is 
required here. 
Whether appellant's identity as a creditor 
was known or reasonably ascertainable by 
appellee cannot be answered on this record. 
Neither the Oklahoma Supreme Court nor 
the Court of Appeals nor the District Court 
considered the question. Appellee of 
course was aware that her husband en-
dured a long stay at St John Medical Cen-
ter, but it is not clear that this awareness 
translates into a knowledge of appellant's 
claim. We therefore must remand the case 
for further proceedings to determine 
whether "reasonably diligent efforts," 
Mennonite, supra, 462 U.S., at 798, n. 4, 
108 S.Ct, at 2711, n. 4, would have identi-
fied appellant and uncovered its claim. If 
appellant's identity was known or "reason-
ably ascertainable," then termination of ap-
pellant's claim without actual notice violat-
ed due process. 
IV 
We hold that Oklahoma's nonclaim stat-
ute is not a self-executing statute of limita-
tions. Rather, the statute operates in con-
nection with Oklahoma's probate proceed-
ings to "adversely affect" appellant's prop-
erty interest Thus, if appellant's identity 
as a creditor was known or "reasonably 
ascertainable," then the Due Process 
Clause requires that appellant be given 
"[njotice by mail or other means as certain" 
to ensure actual notice." Mennonite, su-
pra, at 800, 103 S.Ct, at 2712. According-
ly, the judgment of the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court is reversed and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice BLACKMUN concurs in the 
result 
Chief Justice REHNQUIST 
dissenting. 
In Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 518, 
102 S.Ct 781, 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982), the 
Court upheld against challenge under the 
Due Process Clause an Indiana statute pro-
viding that severed mineral interests which 
had not been used for a period of 20 yean 
lapsed and reverted to the surface owner 
unless the mineral owner filed a statement 
of claim in the appropriate county office. 
In the present case Oklahoma has enacted 
a statute providing that a contractual claim 
against a decedent's estate is barred if not 
presented as a claim within two months of 
the publication of notice advising creditor! 
of the commencement of probate proceed-
ings. The Court holds the Oklahoma stat-
ute unconstitutional. 
Obviously there is a great difference be* 
tween the 20-year time limit in the Indiana 
statute and the 2-month time limit in the 
Oklahoma statute, but the Court does not 
rest the constitutional distinction between 
the cases on this fact Instead, the consti* 
tutional distinction is premised on the ab-
sence in Texaco, Inc., of the "signifies* 
state action" present in this case. In the 
words of the Court 
"The nonclaim statute becomes operative 
only after probate proceedings have bees 
commenced in state court The court 
must appoint the executor or executrix 
before notice, which triggers the time 
bar, can be given. Only after this court 
appointment is made does the statute 
provide for any notice; § 331 directs the 
executor or executrix to publish notice 
"immediately" after appointment* 
Ante, at 1345-1346. 
Just why the due process implications of 
these two cases should turn upon the "ac-
tivity" of the Oklahoma Probate Court ii 
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lot made clear. Surely from the point of 
mw of the claimant—for whom, after all, 
Ike Due Process Clause is designed to ben-
efit—the difference between having the 
ine bar to his claim activated by a notice 
piblished by a court-appointed executor, as 
I was here, and having the time bar acti-
ftted by acquisition of the mineral interest, 
m it was in Indiana, makes little if any 
difference. 
The owner of a mineral interest in 
bdiana who neither made any use of it for 
V years nor filed a statement of claim, 
would lose a quiet title action brought in 
(be Indiana courts against him by the sur-
face owner because those courts would ap-
ply the 20-year statute of limitations. The 
petitioner in the present caslHost a suit in 
the Oklahoma courts because those courts 
applied the 2-month statute of limitations 
eootained in the Oklahoma probate statute. 
Why there is "state action" in the latter 
cue, but not in the former, remains a 
•ystery which is in no way elucidated by 
the court's opinion. The factual differ-
aees which the court points out, showing 
Ikt the probate court is "intimately in-
lohred" in the application of the Oklahoma 
lODclaim statute, seem to me trivial. 
Probate proceedings have been tradition-
ally uncontested and administrative, de-
aigned to transfer assets from someone 
who has died to his successors. Before 
writing these transfers, probate codes uni-
versally require that the estate settle the 
debts of the decedent, and to do this it is 
Mcessary that claims against the estate be 
•nhaled and proved. Ante, at 1347. 
Once the debts of the estate are paid, the 
lecessary steps can be taken to distribute 
ie remainder of the property. 
Occasionally there may be a disputed 
ebim against the estate, which is then in 
•oit jurisdictions tried like any other civil 
ant Occasionally there may be a dispute 
0m the validity of the will, with a result-
art will contest. Occasionally there may 
ke objections to the account of the executor 
ir the administrator, which are then in 
wit jurisdictions heard and decided by the 
probate court. But by and large, the typi-
cal probate proceeding—and the one in-
volved in the instant case seems to have 
followed that pattern—is uncontested, and 
the publication of notice to creditors simply 
shortens the otherwise applicable statute 
of limitations. 
The "intimate involvement" of the Pro-
bate Court in the present case was entirely 
of an administrative nature. 
Would this Court have struck down the 
Indiana mineral lapse statute involved in 
Texaco, Inc., if that statute had provided— 
as an additional protection to mineral 
owners—that a state official should publish 
notice to all mineral owners of the effect of 
the operation of the lapse statute? I find it 
difficult to believe that would be the case, 
and yet the thrust of the Court's reasoning 
today points in that direction. Virtually 
meaningless state involvement, or lack of 
it, rather than the effect of the statute in 
question on the rights of the party whose 
claim is cut off, is held dispositive. 
The Court observes that in Oklahoma, it 
is the court-ordered publication of notice 
that triggers the running of the statute of 
limitations. This judicial involvement, the 
Court concludes, is inconsistent with th£ 
"self executing feature," of the time bar in 
Texaco, Inc. Ante, at 1346. This reading 
of the term "self executing" is, I believe, 
out of context and contrary to common 
sense. That term refers only to the ab-
sence of a judicial or other determination 
that itself extinguishes the claimant's 
rights. This is made clear by the Texaco, 
Inc., Court's juxtaposition of "the self exe-
cuting feature of the [Indiana] statute and 
a subsequent judicial determination that a 
particular lapse did in fact occur." 454 
U.S., at 533, 102 S.Ct, at 794. Certainly 
the Oklahoma provision is more like the 
former than the latter, and there is no 
reason to conclude that the perfunctory 
administrative involvement of the Okla-
homa probate court triggers a greater level 
of due process protection. 
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Justice O'Connor did not participate. 
1. Statutes <*=»54 
Test for federal preemption of Puerto 
Rico law is same as test under supremacy 
clause for preemption of law of state. U.S. 
C.A. Const Art. 6, cl. 2. 
2. Statutes «=»54 
War and National Emergency *=>103, 
302 
Congress' passage and subsequent re-
peal of comprehensive federal statutes pro-
viding for allocation and price controls on 
petroleum products did not manifest con-
gressional intent to preempt gasoline price 
regulation by Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico in favor of free market controL 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 
1973, § 2 et seq.f as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 751 et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const Art 6, cl. 2. 
3. States «=>18.3 
Clear and manifest preemptive purpose 
is always required, before federal legisla-
tion can be found to supersede historic 
police power of states. U.S.C.A. Const 
Art. 6, cl. 2. 
4. States *»18.3 
There can be no federal preemption in 
vacuo, without constitutional text or feder-
al statute to assert U.S.C.A. Const Art 
6, cl. 2. 
5. States *=»18.7 
When comprehensive federal scheme 
intentionally leaves portion of regulated 
field without controls, then preemptive in-
ference can be drawn—not from federal 
government's inaction alone, but from its 
inaction joined with action. U.S.CA 
Const Art 6, cl. 2. • 
Syllabus * 
In 1973, Congress passed the Emer-
gency Petroleum Allocation Act (EPAA), 
pinion porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
he Re* reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Cb, 
